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Abstract 
 
 
The dissertation consists of two essays. In the first essay, we investigate the relation of 
government ownership to the idiosyncratic volatility of Saudi Arabian firms that traded in the 
Saudi stock exchange between 2010 and 2016. The results show that publicly traded firms with an 
increase in government ownership have less idiosyncratic volatility. Furthermore, we investigate 
market leverage ratio, dividend payout ratio, and illiquidity ratio as potential roles in which 
government ownership influences the idiosyncratic volatility. The results prove the negative 
relationship between government ownership and idiosyncratic volatility. In the second essay, we 
investigate the association between government ownership and momentum trading of firms traded 
in the Saudi stock exchange between 2010 and 2016. The results show that firms with higher state 
ownership are expected to have greater price momentum. We used two approaches: the portfolio 
sorting approach and the fixed effect approach, and these two approaches confirm the positive 
relationship between government ownership and momentum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: - Government ownership (G32), Corporate Governance (G34), Idiosyncratic risk 
(G11), Momentum (G12).  
Keywords: Volatility, Government Ownership, Momentum.
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CHAPTER 1 
Firm Specific Risk and Government Ownership 
 
1 Introduction 
Government ownership plays a vital role in shaping manager's decisions and a firm's  value. 
Hence, these decisions and activities impact idiosyncratic risk or firm-specific risk. In this regard, 
one study used the idiosyncratic risk to calculate the stock price informativeness (Ben Nasr and 
Cosset, 2014). They suggest a negative relationship between government ownership and the 
informativeness of stock price. Also, a recent study suggests that government ownership is 
associated with a  firm’s valuation (Boubakri et al., 2018). That said, we believe that the impact of 
the beneficial role of government ownership will modify firm-specific risk. 
We aim to examine the influence of the beneficial role of government ownership on 
idiosyncratic risk. Furthermore, we examine ways in which government ownership potentially 
influences idiosyncratic volatility. In particular, we investigate market leverage ratio, dividend 
payout ratio, and illiquidity ratio as potential roles through which government ownership 
influences idiosyncratic volatility. 
The first potential role is the firm's liquidity. We adopted Amihud's illiquidity ratio as a 
measurement for the firm's liquidity (Amihud, 2002). Recognizing the connection between state 
ownership and the firm's liquidity is fundamental for establishing the useful role of government 
ownership in our sample. Accordingly, the government’s role as a safeguard and a banker can be 
valuable in expanding firm recognition and liquidity which eventually decreases leverage and 
idiosyncratic volatility1. Our results indicate that government ownership decreases idiosyncratic 
volatility by raising firm recognition and liquidity. Firm recognition (Loughran and Schultz, 2005) 
plays an essential role in attracting investors, improving liquidity, and eventually reducing the cost 
                                                          
1 Saudi Arabia's government through their major agencies (i.e., Public investment Fund, General organization for social insurance, and Public 
pension agency) own about 32% of market capitalization of the Saudi banks in 2019. 
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of capital. Accordingly, in a separate model, the evidence suggests that the government taking on 
the role of safeguard can be useful in increasing firm recognition and liquidity. 
The second potential role is the market leverage ratio (measured by total debt over the firm’s 
market value). The results suggest that government ownership decreases idiosyncratic volatility 
by reducing leverage. More specifically, our results indicate that government ownership enhances 
the firm’s liquidity, which reduces the transaction cost and lowers leverage by increasing 
preference of equity financing when raising capital. 
The third potential role is the dividend payout ratio (measured by dividend payout divided by 
the firm's total assets). According to financial theory, stock prices are a function of the present 
value of expected cash flows. Thus, stock return volatility is affected by expected dividends' cash 
flows.  The signaling theory attempts to describe how managers can use the dividends to signal 
the firm's quality, future cash flow, and profitability (Miller and Rock,1985). Hence, they could 
use the dividends to convey information to investors in an indirect way, because under information 
asymmetry outside investors typically have imperfect information about the firm's situation. Also, 
previous research proposes that dividends decrease the information asymmetry problem (Khang 
and King, 2002). In the same vein, Thanatawee (2012) examines the relationship between 
government ownership and the firm’s dividends. He claims that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
with a significant level of government ownership have greater dividend payments because they 
have a connection with state-owned banks. Because of this, they may face less financial stress 
which enables them to pay higher dividends. Our results suggest that government ownership also 
decreases idiosyncratic volatility by increasing the dividend payout ratio. In particular, in a 
separate model, our findings indicate that government ownership rises the firm’s dividends payout. 
As a result, this signals bright prospects for the firm in the stock market, which eventually reduces 
the idiosyncratic volatility.  
The predictor variable is the firm’s idiosyncratic risk estimated by the log of standard 
deviation of the sum of squared residuals from market model log(IV_CAPM), Fama-French 3-
factor model log(IV_FF3), or total volatility log(IV_SD), which is estimated by the natural 
logarithm of standard deviation of daily returns over each year. That said, the volatility of residuals 
explicates the unexplained variation of returns driven by the firm's information flow. 
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Earlier research suggests opposing evidence about the beneficial role of government 
ownership, but most of the previous studies examine a negative impact of government ownership 
on idiosyncratic volatility which raises the question of whether governments can positively impact 
publicly traded firms' idiosyncratic volatility. 
 Therefore, to evaluate benefits of government ownership on idiosyncratic risk, we employ a 
sample of 669 firm year observations on 127 unique Saudi Arabian non-financial firms that traded 
in the Saudi stock exchange for the seven years between 2010 and 2016. 
We investigate these issues for two reasons. First, government ownership in the world’s total 
stock market is almost 20% (Boubakri et al., 2018). Moreover, government ownerships control 
more than 75% of the world's oil supplies, and they continue to keep a heavy hand on the oil 
industry (The Economist, January 2012). Also, through its major government shareholders, the 
Saudi Arabian government (i.e., Public Investment Fund, General Organization for Social 
Insurance, and Public Pension Agency) owned about 42% of the total market capitalization in 2018 
which is 451 billion U.S. dollars and 32% of market capitalization of the Saudi banks in 2019. The 
second reason is, in general, most of the investors are exposed to idiosyncratic risk since their 
portfolios are not diversified. As a result, investors demand higher compensation for exposure to 
idiosyncratic risk (Kerins et al., 2004; Elisabeth, 2011). 
The foregoing reasons provoked our interest in investigating the impact of government 
ownership on idiosyncratic volatility. Moreover, this study adds to earlier literature on the 
determinants of idiosyncratic risk and the importance of state ownership, especially in emerging 
markets. 
We present robust evidence that greater government ownership correlates with lower 
idiosyncratic volatility. Also, after investigating the potential roles through which government 
ownership can influence idiosyncratic volatility, we find robust evidence that government 
ownership improves the firm’s liquidity which reduces the transaction cost, increases preference 
of equity financing, and lowers leverage which eventually decreases idiosyncratic volatility. Also, 
government ownership will increase the firm’s dividend payout, which may send a strong positive 
signal about the firm’s view in the stock market which ultimately reduces the idiosyncratic 
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volatility. Moreover, the government acting as a safeguard and as a banker can be useful in 
increasing firm recognition and liquidity and in eventually reducing idiosyncratic volatility. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights some of the well-
established government ownerships, idiosyncratic volatility theories, and addresses empirical 
studies that show how liquidity, dividends, and leverage relates to idiosyncratic volatility and 
government ownership. In Section 3 we present the data and methodology, and hypotheses 
development. Section 4 shows the results. We present our conclusion in Section 5. 
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2 Literature review 
2.1 Government ownership 
Prior research provides conflicting evidence on the beneficial role of government ownership. 
One line of literature supports the negative role of government ownership for many reasons. The 
first reason is that the government has motives to be less transparent. Piotroski et al. (2015) imply 
that state owners avoid political costs by suppressing negative information. Likewise, Leuz and 
Gee (2006) propose that companies that are associated with a government suffer from an 
information asymmetry problem because the government might uncover illegal and politically 
motivated transactions. Moreover, Megginson and Netter (2001) suggest that governments tend to 
expropriate stockholders by pursuing political goals that do not correspond with profit 
maximization (e.g., high employment and regional development)2. To conceal this expropriation, 
bureaucrats and managers in government-owned companies may manipulate earnings or financial 
reports, resulting in a less transparent environment. Because the cost of collecting private firm-
specific information is higher in less informative environments, government-owned companies 
may discourage informed trading which leads to less informative prices (Grossman and Stiglitz, 
1980). 
The second reason is that firms with government ownership suffer from lower accounting 
quality3. Chaney et al. (2011) suggest that firms with government ownership have lower 
accounting information. Similarly, Bushman et al. (2004) imply that government-owned firms tend 
to have a negative correlation with accounting transparency. Furthermore, Fan et al. (2007) report 
inferior accounting quality for privatized companies because governments often use inferior 
accounting quality for privatized companies and because governments often use political 
connections to maintain their control4. Likewise, Wang et al. (2008) state that firms with 
government ownership tend to hire smaller auditing firms than privatized firms.  
                                                          
2 Bushman and Piotroski (2006) propose that the state's utilization of firm resources is more severe with lower political rights environment. 
3 (Chen et al., 2007) observe a positive relation between stock price informativeness and investment sensitivity to stock price. 
4 (Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009) propose that governments shareholders are reluctant to abandon control even years after privatization. 
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The third reason is that government ownership tends to increase information uncertainty. Kim 
and Verrecchia (1994) discuss how the lower information transparency surrounding government-
owned enterprises leads to lower levels of public information incorporated into stock prices, 
suggesting smaller advantages to professional traders and decreasing the information asymmetry 
endured by unskilled traders. Furthermore, Jin and Myers (2006) find a positive relation between 
stock prices’ informativeness and countries’ transparency. Moreover, Gul et al. (2010) 
demonstrate the impact of government ownership concentration, financial reporting quality, and 
foreign ownership on synchronicity. Gul et al.’s (2017) results suggest that stock prices are less 
informative when the major owner has a political connection. As a result, this work is in line with 
the idea that government ownership results in ambiguous financial disclosures and lowers minority 
shareholders' protection rights (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Also, Gul et al. (2017) find that auditor 
quality and foreign ownership are positively related to stock informativeness. 
However, the second line of literature also supports advantages of state ownership. Beuselinck 
et al. (2017) propose that state ownership usually correlates with a higher valuation. Also, 
Boubakri et al. (2018) find a nonlinear relation between market value and government ownership. 
Moreover, and consistent with the soft budget constraints, Chaney et al. (2011) suggest that 
investors will accept a higher cost of debt if firms with lower financial reporting have a connection 
with political parties or the government. Therefore, this political connection might result in soft 
budget constraint (Kornai, 1986). Moreover, Boubakri et al. (2012) suggest that the protective role 
of government may rescue firms in distressed times, and investors value this protective role 
investors. Also, Faccio et al. (2006) suggest that the government as a major shareholder will 
probably bail out their firms with its significant financial resources, and this role can be observed 
and valued by investors. Moreover, there are other benefits related to government ownership such 
as protecting political firms from competitors. 
Furthermore, government ownership can also be related to better corporate governance and 
better monitoring (Attig et al., 2008; Borisova et al., 2012) which may limit agency costs problems 
while improving the firm's transparency and reducing asymmetric information (Hope et al., 2009). 
Also, firms with government ownership are subject to considerably more media attention, which 
improves the public information environment (Vega, 2006). 
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In the same vein, Borisova and Yadav (2015) examine asymmetric information among 
investors in government-owned firms. They propose that firms with government ownership have 
lower overall information asymmetry.  
2.2 Idiosyncratic volatility 
Most idiosyncratic volatility theories fall into one of two categories. The first category is 
fundamentals theories, and the second is behavioral-based or irrational theories. These two 
categories propose different causes and measurements for idiosyncratic volatility.  
On the one hand, the behavioral (noise) hypotheses suggest that idiosyncratic return variation 
represents the pricing errors or noise trading by unsophisticated traders who neglect the 
fundamentals analysis. The noise theories measured idiosyncratic volatility by 𝜎𝑒
2 the standard 
deviation of the residuals 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 from the market model and Fama-French 3-factor model (Campbell 
et al.,2001; Xu and Malkiel, 2003; Kelly, 2007; Yang and Zhang, 2008). Furthermore, the 
behavioral theories imply that stock fundamentals do not explain stock prices but instead these 
prices subject to errors (Shiller, 1981; LeRoy and Porter, 1981; Hirshleifer, 2001; Campbell et al., 
2001). Besides, Chichernea et. al (2015) state that the investment horizon of institutional 
ownership is negatively associated with idiosyncratic risk. Also, they suggest that institutions with 
a longer horizon might contribute to the recent decrease in idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, they 
suggest that institutions with a long investment horizon are likely to favor stocks with low 
idiosyncratic risk because they benefit from mispricing. 
On the other hand, the fundamentals theories propose that idiosyncratic return variation 
represents the change in idiosyncratic value-relevant information. Roll (1988) was the first to 
suggest that the firm's information drives idiosyncratic volatility. He indicated that the firm's 
information is incorporated into daily prices by the informed trader. Also, prior research supports 
Roll’s (1988) proposal that more firm ambiguity or less firm-specific information is related to 
lower idiosyncratic return variation or higher 𝑅2 (Morck et al., 2000; Ferreira and Laux, 2007; 
Huttonet al.,2009). 
Furthermore, the fundamentals theories suggest that stock return movements are driven by the 
firm's expected cashflow and the firm’s information because the stock price is a function of the 
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present value of all its expected cash flow. Additionally, a growing literature has accumulated 
evidence relating to the escalation in total idiosyncratic volatility to stock fundamentals 
(Vuolteenaho, 2002; Chang and Dong, 2006; Zhang, 2010). Moreover, prior research (Morck et 
al., 2000) suggests that the idiosyncratic risk is associated with the quality of government. 
The fundamentals theories measured idiosyncratic volatility by 𝑅2 or the inverse return 
synchronicity from the expanded model, market model, or Fama-French 3-factor model. 
Therefore, many papers define idiosyncratic risk as a proxy for information flow (Wurgler, 2000; 
Ferreira et al., 2007; Ben Nasr et al., 2014). 
In the same vein, in their studies, Bhagat et. al (1985); Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 
(1998); Blackwell et. al (2006); and Dierkens (2006) argue that firms with higher asymmetric 
information or greater idiosyncratic uncertainty tend to have greater idiosyncratic volatility. 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1998) measured idiosyncratic volatility by residual volatility as 
the standard deviation of the residuals of the market model of daily returns. As a result, they argue 
that investors might bear some firm-specific uncertainty until the information is uncovered in the 
market. Therefore, they conclude that there is a positive relation between asymmetric information 
and idiosyncratic volatility. Our definition for idiosyncratic risk is similar to Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam’s (1998) definition. 
Moreover, most of the theories on the relationship between government ownership and 
idiosyncratic risk suggest that more ambiguity on the part of the firm will lead to less firm-specific 
information, which results in conflicting relation with idiosyncratic volatility. Therefore, there is 
a consensus that government ownership results in less firm-specific information, and from this 
point, there is a large debate on its relationship with idiosyncratic volatility. However, this is the 
first study that investigates the beneficial role of government ownership on idiosyncratic volatility.  
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3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Hypotheses developments 
This paper aims to examine the beneficial impact of government ownership on idiosyncratic 
volatility. Furthermore, we investigate different roles through which government ownership 
potentially influences idiosyncratic volatility. Specifically, we study market leverage ratio, 
dividend payout ratio, and illiquidity ratio as possible roles through which government ownership 
affects idiosyncratic risk. In this section, we derive the main hypotheses for the beneficial role of 
government ownership on idiosyncratic volatility. Also, we derive the supported hypotheses for 
potential roles. 
3.1.1 Government ownership and idiosyncratic volatility 
Idiosyncratic risk estimates the component of the variation in returns that cannot be captured 
by the market or multi-factor model. There is a long debate on whether greater idiosyncratic  return 
variation captures idiosyncratic value-relevant information (estimated by the inverse return 
synchronicity or 𝑅2) or noise (measured as the standard deviation of the residual from the 
expanded, market, or multi-factor model 𝜎𝑒
2).  
 Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1998) argue that stocks with greater asymmetric 
information about their value have a greater residual risk in their returns. Also, they suggest that 
stock asymmetric information is high when managers have higher firm-specific information than 
investors. As a result, they argue that investors might bear some firm-specific uncertainty until the 
information is uncovered in the market. Therefore, they conclude that there is a positive relation 
between asymmetric information and idiosyncratic risk. 
Also, most of the theories on the association between government ownership and idiosyncratic 
risk suggest that more ambiguity on the part of the firm will lead to less firm-specific information, 
which results in opposing relation with idiosyncratic volatility. Therefore, there is a consensus that 
government ownership results in less firm-specific information, and from this point, there is a large 
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debate on its relationship with idiosyncratic volatility. However, this is the first study that 
investigates the beneficial role of government ownership on idiosyncratic volatility.  
Furthermore, in Table 6 we find evidence that the government as a safeguard and as a banker 
can be useful in increasing firm recognition (Loughran and Schultz, 2005) and liquidity. As a 
result, the higher liquidity will lead to a lower degree of asymmetric information. Therefore, we 
hypothesized:  
H main: The government ownership provides an implicit state guarantee that mitigates 
the information asymmetry problem which eventually reduces the idiosyncratic risk. 
To examine this premise, we used the following model:- 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑉)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑖,𝑡−1   
 The predictor variable is the firm’s idiosyncratic risk estimated by the log of standard 
deviation of the sum of squared residuals from market model log(IV_CAPM), Fama-French 3-
factor model log(IV_FF3), or total volatility log(IV_SD), which is estimated by the log of standard 
deviation of daily returns over each year. The independent variables are GOV_Dum a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm has the government ownership and zero otherwise, GOV_Stake 
(%) the government ownership as a percentage, Market leverage ratio Leverage. M (%)  is 
measured by total debt over the firm market value , Log(Size) the size as the natural logarithm of 
the firm's total assets, Profitability (%) profitability as net income to the total assets ratio (ROA), 
variance of return return_variance  as the variance of the net income over the total assets, 
Illiquidity Log(Illiquidity)  by an average yearly mean of daily illiquidity where daily illiquidity is 
the absolute return divide by volume in local currency, and Age the firm’s age. 
In the main model, function 1, there are some variables that are based on the lagged value 
( 𝐼. 𝑒.  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑙𝑜𝑔((𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦)) 𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑖,𝑡−1,
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑖,𝑡−1 )   while the dependent variable 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑉)𝑖,𝑡 is based on the current level. 
We used this specification because our calculation for the dependent variable 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑉)𝑖,𝑡 is based 
on daily frequency, while explanatory variables are based on yearly frequency. 
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3.1.2 Liquidity 
Prior literature implies that the firm’s liquidity is related positively to idiosyncratic risk (Lo 
and Wang, 2000). However, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) suggest that idiosyncratic risk is 
associated negatively with liquidity. Spiegel and Wang (2005) regress Gibbs, Amihud, and 
Amivest liquidity ratios on the firm-specific volatility, and they find a robust negative relationship 
between them. Merton (1987) concluded that as more investors are aware of a firm, the firm's 
liquidity improves. Moreover, Alhomaidi et al. (2019) investigate social norms and stock trading 
in Saudi Arabia, and they observe a negative relationship between a broader investor base and 
idiosyncratic risk. 
We use Amihud's illiquidity ratio as a measurement for the firm’s liquidity (Amihud, 2002). 
We suggest that government ownership decreases idiosyncratic volatility through increasing firm 
recognition and enhancing the firm’s liquidity (information asymmetry). Firm recognition plays a 
vital role in attracting investors, which results in improving liquidity and information asymmetry 
(Loughran and Schultz, 2005). Therefore, we hypothesized that the government as a safeguard and 
as a banker could be effective in increasing both firm recognition and liquidity while reducing the 
degree of the information asymmetry problem. 
HA: Government ownership make stocks more recognized and attract investors, so it 
increases liquidity. 
3.1.3 Dividends 
Prior research suggests that stock return volatility is affected by expected dividends. Miller 
and Rock (1985) use signaling theory to describe how managers could employ dividends to signal 
the firm's quality, future cash flow, and profitability. Hence, they could employ dividends to 
convey information to investors in an indirect way because under information asymmetry outside 
investors typically have incomplete information about the firm's status. Also, prior research 
suggests that information asymmetry is decreased by the firm’s dividends (Khang and King, 2002). 
In the same vein, Thanatawee (2012) studies the relation of government ownership on the firm’s 
dividends. He claims that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with a significant level of government 
ownership have greater dividend payments because they have a connection with state-owned 
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banks. Because of this, they may face less financial stress, which enables them to pay higher 
dividends. 
Moreover, prior research uses dividend payout as a proxy for risk. Therefore, the prior 
research reaffirms the link between dividend payout and idiosyncratic volatility. 
We hypothesized that government ownership also decreases idiosyncratic volatility by 
increasing the dividend payout ratio. Specifically, in Table 7 our findings imply that government 
ownership increases the firm’s dividend payout which may send a strong signal about bright 
prospects of the firm in the stock market, which ultimately reduces the idiosyncratic volatility.  
HB: Government ownership will reduce financial pressure which allows firms with 
government ownership to pay higher dividends. 
3.1.4 Market leverage ratio 
Bagehot (1971) suggests that the presence of informed managers and uninformed traders in 
the stock markets generates an adverse selection that can be measured by the firm's information 
asymmetry .  
The information asymmetry is based on transaction costs, and it depends on three main 
elements: order processing, inventory, and adverse selection. The idea here is that an increase in 
illiquidity works as a compensation for dealing with informed managers and rises with the level 
of information asymmetry. Also, Easley et. al (1996); and Easley et. al (2004) observe that adverse 
selection is an essential determinant of liquidity in the market. As a result, illiquidity is an example 
of friction in the market that limits the firm's ability to finance its assets.   
 Lipson and Mortal (2009) study the relationship between liquidity as a proxy of information 
asymmetry and leverage. They observe that firms with more stock liquidity (or low information 
asymmetry) have a lower total debt to total assets ratio and prefer financing assets with equity 
when raising capital. Also, Bharath et. al (2009) hypothesized that information asymmetry 
measured by stock liquidity is a major determinant when raising capital. As a result, they find that 
high levels of information asymmetry have greater leverage.  
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Prior research provides conflicting evidence on the beneficial role of government ownership. 
Some research finds it to be destructive to firms' value (Ben-Nasr et al., 2012; Boubakri et al., 
2005), while others’ research supports the beneficial role of government ownership as they provide 
firms with a soft budget constraint and an implied state guarantee (Faccio et al., 2006).   
However, as presented in Table 6, we find evidence that the government as a safeguard and 
as a banker can be effective in increasing firm recognition (Loughran and Schultz, 2005) and 
liquidity. The higher liquidity will decrease the level of information asymmetry, which reduces the 
transaction cost and lowers leverage by increasing the preference of equity financing when raising 
capital. Therefore, we hypothesized that government ownership decreases leverage, because of the 
lower level of information asymmetry which supports the beneficial role of government 
ownership. As a result, this leverage role will reduce the idiosyncratic volatility as we observe a 
positive relationship between leverage and idiosyncratic risk from the main result. 
HC: The government ownership provides implicit state guarantee that mitigates 
information asymmetry problem which eventually reduces the leverage.  
3.2 Sample and Measurement 
3.2.1 Sample 
The government continues to be one of the major shareholders of the Saudi market. The 
primary government shareholders (i.e., Public Investment Fund, General Organization for Social 
Insurance, and Public Pension Agency) owned about 42% of the total market capitalization in 
2018, which is 451 billion U.S. dollars, and 32% of market capitalization of the Saudi banks in 
2019. Also, the beneficial role of government ownership in Saudi Arabia gives us the advantage 
of studying such a role in low information environments because the Saudi Arabian government’s 
role as a safeguard and as a banker can be useful in increasing firm recognition and liquidity, and 
this role is valued and observed by investors. Also, ownership structure is expected to be more 
definite in emerging markets than in a rich information environment (Verrecchia, 2001), and the 
Saudi Arabian stock market is one of the emerging markets. 
Our sample consists of 669 firm-year observations on 127 unique Saudi Arabian non-financial 
firms that traded in the Saudi stock exchange for seven years between 2010 and 2016. 
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The firm fundamentals are from Bloomberg terminal (yearly from 2010 to 2016). Also, we 
use daily and monthly prices from the market index (TASI), as well as market return from 2010 to 
2016. Moreover, we use the end-of-month Saudi Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR) from 
Bloomberg terminal. The SIBOR rate serves as a measurement for the monthly risk-free rate for 
seven years  from 2010 to 2016. More importantly, we hand-collect government ownership data 
from the market index (TASI) from 2010 to 2016.  
Table 1: The descriptive statistics 
 This table shows descriptive statistics for variables applied in our regression of the impact of government 
ownership on idiosyncratic volatility. The sample consists of 669firm year observations on 127 unique Saudis 
non-financial firms that traded in the Saudi stock exchange for seven years from between 2010 and 2016. The 
regression variables are the predictor variable is the firm’s idiosyncratic risk estimated by the log of 
standard deviation of the sum of squared residuals from the Fama-French 3-factor model log(IV_FF3), 
GOV_Dum a binary variable that equals1 if the firm has the government ownership and zero 
otherwise, GOV_Stake (%) the government ownership as percentage, Leverage. M (%) Market leverage 
ratio measured by total debt over the firm market value, Log(Size) the size as the natural logarithm of 
the firm's total assets, Variance of return variance of return as the variance of the net income over the 
total assets, Profitability (%) profitability as net income to the total assets ratio (ROA), Vol(ROA) 
variance of return as the variance of the net income over the total assets , Log(Illiquidity) Illiquidity 
measured by an average yearly mean of daily illiquidity where daily illiquidity is the absolute return 
divide by volume in local currency, and Age the firm’s age . 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
log(IV_FF3) 669 -4.140 0.362 -5.025 -1.784 
GOV_Stake(%) 669 0.080 0.172 0.000 0.838 
GOV_Dum 669 0.330 0.471 0.000 1.000 
Profitability (%)  669 0.066 0.090 -0.512 0.440 
log(Illiquidity ) 669 -21.066 0.987 -25.047 -18.551 
Leverage. M (%) 649 0.174 0.175 0.000 0.711 
log(Size) 669 6.132 1.090 1.790 11.278 
Age 669 26.393 14.217 2.000 63.000 
Variance of return 643 0.120 0.108 0.015 0.346 
 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for variables used in our model of the influence of 
government ownership on idiosyncratic volatility. The sample consists of 669 firm-year 
observations. We find that the average government ownership is 33%, and the highest percentage 
is 83.8%. The profitability for the full sample is about 6.6%. 
Table 2: Difference in means between the private and the government ownership  
 This table presents the two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances for each variable in this paper. 
The null hypothesis is that the two-population means are the same, but the two population variances  
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(table continued) 
may differ. The regression variables are the firm’s idiosyncratic risk estimated by the log of standard 
deviation of the sum of squared residuals from Fama-French 3-factor model log(IV_FF3), GOV_Dum a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has the state ownership and zero otherwise, LEV (%) Market 
leverage ratio measured by total debt over the firm market value, Log(Size) the size as the natural 
logarithm of the firm's total assets, Profitability (%) profitability as net income to the total assets ratio 
(ROA) , and log(ILLIQ ) Illiquidity measured  by an average yearly mean of daily illiquidity where 
daily illiquidity is the absolute return divide by volume in local currency. 
   GOV_Dum Obs log(IV_FF3) Profitability  log(ILLIQ ) LEV log(Size) 
Private 
Ownership  
 0 
433 -4.096 0.057 -20.979 0.172 5.926 
Government 
Ownership  
1  
216 -4.231 0.084 -21.241 0.179 6.551 
Difference in 
means 
    -0.135 0.026 -0.263 0.007 0.625 
T-test     -4.598 3.631 -3.262 0.496 7.243 
P-value     0.000 0.000 0.001 0.620 0.000 
 
Table 2 shows the difference in means between firms with government ownership and firms 
with only privatized ownership. We note that the government ownership sample does have a lower 
idiosyncratic volatility mean by 3.19% and this difference is significant at 1%. Moreover, Table 2 
shows that at 1% significant level, the firms with government ownership do have more 
profitability, size, and liquidity. Furthermore, the difference in means for leverage between these 
two samples is the same.
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Table 3: Pearson pairwise correlation 
This table shows Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients between the variables used in our regression. The sample consists of 669firm year 
observations on 127 unique Saudis non-financial firms that traded in the Saudi stock exchange for seven years from between 2010 and 2016. The 
regression variables are the predictor variable is the firm’s idiosyncratic risk estimated by the log of standard deviation of the sum of squared 
residuals from the Fama-French 3-factor model log(IV_FF3), GOV_Dum a binary variable that equals1 if the firm has the government ownership 
and zero otherwise, GOV_Stake (%) the government ownership as percentage, Leverage. M (%) Market leverage ratio measured by total debt 
over the firm market value, Log(Size) the size as the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets, Profitability (%) profitability as net income to 
the total assets ratio (ROA), Vol(ROA) variance of return as the variance of the net income over the total assets , Log(Illiquidity) Illiquidity 
measured by an average yearly mean of daily illiquidity where daily illiquidity is the absolute return divide by volume in local currency, and 
Age the firm’s age . Bold font implies statistical significance at the 1% level. 
  Log(IV_ff3) GOV_Stake(%) GOV_Dum Profitability 
(%)  
log(Illiquidity ) Leverage 
(%) 
log(Size) Age Vol(ROA) 
Log(IV_ff3) 1.000                 
GOV_Stake(%) -0.218 1.000               
GOV_Dum -0.175 0.658 1.000             
Profitability (%)  -0.159 0.123 0.139 1.000           
log(Illiquidity ) 0.101 -0.214 -0.125 0.148 1.000         
Leverage (%) -0.044 -0.003 0.020 -0.448 -0.251 1.000       
log(Size) 0.075 0.326 0.270 0.392 -0.004 -0.346 1.000     
Age -0.003 0.070 0.036 0.244 0.257 -0.209 0.331 1.000   
Vol(ROA) 0.172 -0.114 -0.074 -0.036 -0.069 -0.089 0.005 -0.151 1.000 
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Table 3 shows Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients between the model's variables. The 
results in Table 3 confirm the negative association between state ownership and idiosyncratic 
volatility at a 1% level of significance with (-0.21 and -0.175 ). Also, the two measurements of 
government ownership have a positive and significant correlation at 1% with size, liquidity, and 
profitability. 
3.2.2 Measurement of idiosyncratic volatility 
The predictor variable is the firm’s idiosyncratic risk estimated by three measurements: the 
log of standard deviation of the sum of squared residuals from market model log(IV_CAPM), 
Fama-French 3-factor model log(IV_FF3) following Ang et al. (2006), or total volatility 
log(IV_SD), which is estimated by the log of standard deviation of daily returns over each year. 
We estimate yearly idiosyncratic risk relative to the market and multi-factor model because 
government ownership data is available at yearly frequency. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡 𝑀𝐾𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     (1) 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡 𝑀𝐾𝑇 + 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (2) 
𝐼𝑉 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [𝑆𝐷 (
1
𝑁
∑ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
2𝑁
𝑡=1 )]     (3) 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the excess rate of return for firm i at day t. The 𝑀𝐾𝑇 is the excess market return. Also, 
small minus big (SMB) is the size factor, and high minus low (HML) refers to the value factor. 
The standard deviation of the sum of squared residuals 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  from the market model as the function 
(1) or Fama-French 3-factor model as the function (2). Our estimate residuals based on monthly 
regressions of daily stock returns for each firm.   
The data for the size SMB and value HML factors are not accessible for Saudi Arabia, so we 
followed Fama and French (2012) and constructed the SMB factor and the HML factor. Precisely, 
we calculate market equity ME for the size as the price times shares outstanding. Also, for the 
HML factor, we measure the value factor by book-to-market ratio BM.  At this point, we define 
BE as the book value per share times shares outstanding. In BE calculation, we calculated the book 
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value per share as the total stockholders’ equity, minus preferred stock, divided by shares 
outstanding. Here, we eliminate deferred and investment tax from our construction for book equity 
BE due to the data unavailability. Then, we calculate book-to-market ratio BM as BE for the June 
of year t-1, over market capitalization of Dec of year t-1. We collect daily prices from the market 
index (TASI), and Bloomberg Terminal to gather shares outstanding and other fundamental data.   
At this stage, we can apply the portfolio formation by constricting six portfolios in January at 
year t based on BE and BM ranking at year t-1. In this ranking, we define the big stocks as those 
who are in the top 70% percentile of market capitalization while the small stocks are those in the 
bottom 30% percentile. Also, we define the value stocks as those in the top 70% percentile of BM 
while the growth stocks are those in the bottom 30% percentile. 
Then we calculate daily value weight returns for each portfolio. Also, we estimate daily equal 
weight returns on daily size factor SMB and value factor HML from January at year t until 
December at year t. We repeat the same process until the end of the sample.  
In the next stage, we use the daily market return and the risk-free rate of return to compute the 
excess return of market MRTF. Now we apply the market model and three factors model to 
estimates the firm’s idiosyncratic risk in each year as the standard deviation of the residuals from 
regressing (1) and (2). Lastly, we used the natural logarithm transformation to eliminate outliers 
and to mitigate the impact of heteroskedasticity. 
3.2.3 Measurement of government ownership  
The main independent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has the 
government ownership and zero otherwise. Also, we include government ownership as stake (%) 
of the company owned by the government. The lowest government ownership in our data is 5%, 
and the highest percentage is 83.8% as we see in Table 1. Prior research assigns different threshold 
percentages to define government ownership as a percentage. For example, LaPorta et al. (1999) 
use 20 percent as a threshold to determine the controlling shareholder or the ultimate owner. 
Also, prior research used a dummy variable if the government holds more than 50% of the 
shares and zero otherwise Ben-Nasr and Cosset (2014).  Bortolotti and Faccio (2009) use a dummy 
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variable equal to one if the government retains a golden share (special powers), and zero otherwise. 
Moreover, they used a dummy variable equal to one if the largest ultimate owner is the government 
and zero otherwise Boubakri et al. (2018). 
3.2.4 Control variables 
Prior research suggests some control variables that affect idiosyncratic volatility and 
government ownership (e.g., Cheung and Ng, 1992; Ben-Nasr et al., 2014). First, we add market 
leverage ratio as a control variable measured by total liabilities over the firm’s market equity, and 
the firm’s market capitalization measured by total assets minus total equity plus market 
capitalization. According to Liu et. al (2014), high idiosyncratic volatility firms tend to be highly 
leveraged. Consequently, we predict leverage ratio to have a positive coefficient, implying that 
firms with less leverage are likely to have less idiosyncratic volatility. 
Second, we add the firm's size as a control variable by computing the natural logarithm 
transformation of the firm's total assets to see whether the relationships between the government 
ownership and idiosyncratic volatility are not influenced by size. According to prior research, size 
is highly correlated with total volatility and some of the previous research on the firm-specific risk 
control only for the firm's size (Cheung and Ng, 1992; Chang et al., 2004). Most of the previous 
research suggests that size has a negative relation with idiosyncratic volatility and previous studies 
provide evidence to support this negative correlation (Cheung and Ng, 1992; Bali et al.,2005; Liu 
and Di Iorio, 2012). However, a recent study finds a positive coefficient on size when they 
investigate social norms and stock trading in Saudi Arabia. According to Alhomaidi et al. (2019) 
results, we predict size to have a positive coefficient, implying that the higher the size the higher 
the idiosyncratic volatility.  
Third, we add profitability as a control variable, measured by net income to the total asset 
ratio. Wei and Zhang (2006) suggest a negative relation between firm-specific risk and 
profitability. Therefore, we predict profitability to have a negative coefficient, implying higher 
profitability has less idiosyncratic volatility. 
Fourth, we control for variance of return estimated by the ratio of the variation of the net 
income to the total assets. According to Wei and Zhang (2006), the relationship between firm-
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specific risk and variance of ROE is positive. Thus, we expect a positive coefficient of the variance 
of return, indicating a higher variance of ROA has a higher idiosyncratic volatility.  
Fifth, we control for illiquidity by using the average yearly mean of daily illiquidity where 
daily illiquidity is the absolute return divide by volume in local currency (Amihud, 2002). We 
include illiquidity to control for information asymmetry. Spiegel and Wang (2005) suggest that 
idiosyncratic risk is associated negatively with liquidity. Consequently, we predict a positive 
coefficient of illiquidity, indicating higher liquidity, less idiosyncratic volatility. Finally, we 
include the firm’s age to control for the time trend. Also, to decrease the potential influence of 
outliers in size, liquidity, and idiosyncratic volatility, we use the natural logarithm transformation 
of these variables. 
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4 Results 
4.1 Firm’s idiosyncratic volatility and government ownership 
To examine the effect of government ownership on idiosyncratic volatility, we use the fixed 
effect model with adjusting the standard errors for clustering by firm. In Table 4, we show the 
main results in six models. The results confirm that there is a negative association between 
government ownership and idiosyncratic volatility. First, the first three models show the relation 
of government ownership as a binary variable, GOV_Dum, on all three proxies of idiosyncratic 
volatility, and the estimated coefficients are significant at 1% with log(IV_SD), 5% level of 
significance with log(IV_FF3), and at 10% level of significance with Log(IV_CAPM). The 
estimated coefficients are around -.139, indicating that the presence of government ownership will 
decrease the idiosyncratic volatility by - 13.9%. Second, the government ownership as percentage 
GOV_Stake (%) also negative and significant for the last three models in Table 4. Third, in all 
models in Table 4, the estimated coefficients on profitability are a negative and significant at 1% 
level of significance which indicates that higher profitability has less idiosyncratic volatility, and 
this result is in line with Wei and Zhang’s (2006) study. Fourth, in all models in Table 4, the 
estimated coefficients on illiquidity are a negative and significant at 1% level of significance which 
indicates that a higher liquidity by one unit has a less idiosyncratic volatility by 14.2% according 
to model 4, and this result is in accordance with Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009); and Spiegel 
and Wang (2005). Fifth, the estimated coefficient of leverage is positive and significant at 5% level 
of significance in all models, which indicates that higher leverage has a greater idiosyncratic risk. 
Sixth, size is positively correlated with idiosyncratic volatility. Most of the prior research suggests 
a negative relationship between size and idiosyncratic risk, but we find a positive estimated 
coefficient on size which contradicts previous research correlation (Cheung and Ng, 1992; Bali et 
al.,2005; Liu and Di Iorio, 2012). However, our results work in line with Alhomaidi et al. (2019) 
who applied their study to the Saudi Arabian market, so we believe it is a particular case related to 
Saudi Arabia and may need further investigation in future research. Finally, the variance of return 
is positive and significant only in model 6 and model 4.
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Table 4: The government ownership and the firm’s idiosyncratic volatility 
 This table shows the results of the estimates from the fixed effect model with adjusting the standard errors for clustering by firm. The sample consists of 
669firm year observations on 127 unique Saudis non-financial firms that traded in the Saudi stock exchange for seven years from between 2010 and 2016. 
The predictor variable is the firm’s idiosyncratic risk estimated by the log of standard deviation of the sum of squared residuals from market model 
log(IV_CAPM) , Fama-French 3-factor model log(IV_FF3) , or total volatility log(IV_SD), which is estimated by the log of standard deviation of daily 
returns over each year. The independent variables are GOV_Dum a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has the government ownership and zero 
otherwise, GOV_Stake (%) the government ownership as a percentage, Leverage. M (%) Market leverage ratio measured by total debt over the firm market 
value, Log(Size) the size as the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets, Profitability (%) profitability as net income to the total assets ratio (ROA), 
return_variance variance of return as the variance of the net income over the total assets, Log(Illiquidity) Illiquidity measured by an average yearly mean 
of daily illiquidity where daily illiquidity is the absolute return divide by volume in local currency, and Age the firm’s age . “a”, “b”, and “c” denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
  log(IV_FF3) Log(IV_CAPM) log(IV_SD)  log(IV_FF3) Log (IV_CAPM) log(IV_SD)  
GOV_Dum  -0.139 b -0.140 c -0.138 a       
  (0.066)   (0.076)   (0.036)         
GOV_Stake        -1.679 a -1.419 a -1.004 c 
        (0.522)  (0.541)  (0.596)  
Profitability (%) (T-1 )  -0.737 a -0.923 a -0.834 a -0.761 a -0.944 a -0.848 a 
  (0.213)   (0.277)   (0.221)   (0.208)  (0.275)  (0.216)  
Log(Illiquidity) (T-1 )  0.139 a 0.106 a 0.076 a 0.142 a 0.109 a 0.077 a 
  (0.019)   (0.027)   (0.021)   (0.019)  (0.028)  (0.021)  
Leverage. M (%) (T-1 )  0.376 b 0.514 b 0.232   0.394 b 0.530 b 0.246  
  (0.186)   (0.230)   (0.170)   (0.185)  (0.230)  (0.169)  
Log(Size)  0.102 a 0.066 b -0.005   0.105 a 0.069 b -0.004  
  (0.024)   (0.032)   (0.026)   (0.025)  (0.033)  (0.027)  
Age ( T-1 )  0.053 a 0.061 a 0.074 a 0.051 a 0.059 a 0.073 a 
  (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  
return_variance (T-1 )  0.152   0.196   0.325 c 0.147  0.194  0.330 b 
  (0.141)   (0.182)   (0.166)   (0.140)  (0.181)  (0.164)  
Constant  -3.205 a -3.865 a -1.511 a -3.015 a -3.712 a -1.417 a 
  (0.387)   (0.565)   (0.441)   (0.385)  (0.578)  (0.450)  
Time Trends effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
N  526   526   526   526  526  526  
Adj. R2  0.196   0.120   0.222  0.203  0.122  0.223  
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In the following three subsections, we investigate market leverage ratio, illiquidity ratio, and 
dividend payout ratio as potential roles through which government ownership influences 
idiosyncratic volatility. Also, investigating these potential roles will confirm and define the 
beneficial role of government ownership in our sample. 
Moreover, prior research suggests an inverted-U relationship when testing government 
ownership Boubakri et al.(2018). In unreported result, we did not find any evidence to support this 
claim. 
Lastly, in Table 4, we have a full 669 observations for all the dependent variables and main 
independent variables, but apparently, we only have lower observations in which every variable 
(with control variable ) in the regression has a non-missing value. Therefore, we observe the same 
number of observations in all six models in Table 4. 
4.2 Firm’s leverage and government ownership 
The results in Table 5 show the estimated coefficients on government ownership. They have 
a negative and significant relationship with the firm's leverage because the firms with government 
ownership tend to have higher liquidity as confirmed in Table 6, which reduces the transaction 
cost and lowers leverage by increasing preference of equity financing when raising capital. 
In Table 5, we show five models. The dependent variable in the first the three models (model 
1 to model 3) is the market leverage LEV estimated by the total debt over  the total assets, while 
the dependent variable in the last two models (model 4 and model 5) is the financial leverage DE 
estimated by the total debt over the total equity.  
In model 3 in Table 5, we used the interaction dummy between the government ownership 
GOV_Dum and the firm’s liquidity log(LIQ). The estimated coefficient of the interaction dummy 
is negative and significant at 5% level of significance which confirms the beneficial role of 
government ownership in our sample. 
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Table 5: The government ownership and the firm’s leverage 
This table shows the results of the estimates from the fixed effect model with adjusting the standard 
errors for clustering by firm. The sample consists of 669firm year observations on 127 unique Saudis 
non-financial firms that traded in the Saudi stock exchange for seven years from between 2010 and 
2016. The dependent variable is the firm’s leverage LEV measured by the total debt divided by total 
assets. Also, we used financial leverage DE estimated by the total debt over the total equity. The 
independent variables are: GOV_Dum a binary variable that equals1 if the firm has the government 
ownership and zero otherwise, GOV_Stake (%) the government ownership as percentage, Log(Size) 
the size as the natural logarithm of the firm's sale, Profitability (%) profitability as net income to the 
total assets ratio (ROA). BM (%) firm’s value estimated by the BM ratio or the book value to market 
value ratio. Growth (%) firm’s growth measured by the change of sale fallowing Titman and Wessels 
(1988). Tangibility (%) measured by fixed assets over  total assets. log(LIQ) firm’s liquidity estimated 
by average yearly of daily turnover ( the ratio of trading volume over shares outstanding). “a”, “b”, 
and “c” denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  
 LEV  LEV  LEV  DE  DE  
GOV_Dum -0.063 b   -0.250 a -12.898 b   
 (0.026)    (0.092)  (5.067)    
GOV_Stake (%)   -0.352 c     -101.967 b 
   (0.208)      (49.526)  
Log(Size)  0.021 c 0.020  0.019 c 4.761 c 4.502  
 (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (2.654)  (2.761)  
Profitability (%) -0.419 a -0.421 a -0.394 a -80.338 b -80.252 b 
 (0.104)  (0.106)  (0.113)  (32.876)  (33.280)  
BM (%) -0.099 a -0.100 a -0.127 a -17.808 a -18.128 a 
 (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.027)  (5.821)  (5.888)  
Growth (%) 0.000 a 0.000 b 0.000 a -0.023 a -0.017 a 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Tangibility (%) 0.186 b 0.190 b 0.186 b 53.631 a 54.563 a 
 (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.087)  (15.489)  (15.426)  
log(LIQ)     0.015 c     
     (0.008)      
GOV_Dum* log(LIQ)     -0.035 b     
     (0.016)      
Constant 0.211 b 0.228 b 0.312 a -0.838  4.720  
 (0.098)  (0.105)  (0.112)  (20.958)  (21.805)  
Time Trends effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 585  585  585  582  582  
Adj. R2 0.227  0.224  0.266  0.175  0.176  
 
4.3 Firm’s liquidity and government ownership  
The relationship between state ownership and the firm’s liquidity is central for confirming the 
beneficial role of state ownership in the sample. Therefore, the government role as a safeguard and 
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as a banker can be effective in increasing the firm recognition and liquidity which eventually 
reduces leverage and idiosyncratic volatility. 
In Table 6, we regress illiquidity on government ownership measurements, and the results 
suggest a negative and significant coefficient at a 5% level of significance. Therefore, the results 
indicate that firms with government ownership have higher liquidity.  
Table 6 : The government ownership and the firm’s liquidity 
 This table shows the results of the estimates from the fixed effect model with adjusting the standard 
errors for clustering by firm. The sample consists of 669firm year observations on 127 unique Saudis 
non-financial firms that traded in the Saudi stock exchange for seven years from between 2010 and 
2016. The dependent variable is the firm’s liquidity Log(Illiquidity) Illiquidity measured by an average 
yearly mean of daily illiquidity where daily illiquidity is the absolute return divide by volume in local 
currency. The independent variables are: GOV_Dum a binary variable that equals1 if the firm has the 
government ownership and zero otherwise, GOV_Stake (%) the government ownership as percentage, 
Log(Size) the size as the natural logarithm of the firm's sale, Profitability (%) profitability as net 
income to the total assets ratio (ROA). Leverage. M (%) Market leverage ratio measured by total debt 
over the firm market value, total volatility log(IV_SD), which is estimated by the log of standard 
deviation of daily returns over each year, and Age the firm’s age .“a”, “b”, and “c” denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Model 1  Model 2  
 Log(Illiquidity)  Log(Illiquidity)  
GOV_Dum (T-1 ) -0.387 b     
  (0.171)       
GOV_Stake (%) (T-1 )     -3.874 b 
      (1.536)   
Profitability (%)  -2.592 a -2.560 a 
  (0.556)   (0.545)   
Leverage. M (%)(T-1 ) 2.285 a 2.301 a 
  (0.449)   (0.443)   
Log(Size) (T-1 ) -1.127 a -1.113 a 
  (0.185)   (0.183)   
Age (T-1 ) 0.091 a 0.085 a 
  (0.019)   (0.018)   
log(IV_SD) (T-1 ) 0.156 b 0.163 b 
  (0.077)   (0.076)   
constant -14.728 a -14.506 a 
  (1.230)   (1.235)   
Time Trends effects Yes   Yes   
N 552   552   
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(table continued) 
 
    
Adj. R2 0.203   0.206   
 
4.4 Firm’s dividends and government ownership 
In Table 7, we show the results for the relationship between government ownership and the 
firm’s dividends. Firm’s dividends DIVIDEND measured by dividends paid over total assets. The 
results suggest the estimated coefficients of firm’s dividends are positive and significant at 10 % 
level of significant relationships between the two measurements of government ownership 
(GOV_Dum and GOV_Stake (%)) and the firm's dividends. The results imply that firms with 
greater state ownership are expected to pay greater dividends because they have a connection with 
banks through their ownership in the banking industry and so they face less financial pressure, 
which allows them to pay higher dividends. 
Table 7 : The government ownership and the firm’s dividends 
 This table shows the results of the estimates from the fixed effect model with adjusting the standard 
errors for clustering by firm. The sample consists of 669firm year observations on 127 unique Saudis non-
financial firms that traded in the Saudi stock exchange for seven years from between 2010 and 2016. The 
dependent variable is the firm's dividends DIVIDEND measured by dividends paid divided by total 
assets. The independent variables are GOV_Dum a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has the 
government ownership and zero otherwise, GOV_Stake (%) the government ownership as a percentage, 
Leverage. M (%) Market leverage ratio measured by total debt over the firm market value, Log(Size) the 
size as the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets, Profitability (%) profitability as net income to the 
total assets ratio (ROA), return_variance variance of return as the variance of the net income over the 
total assets , Log(Illiquidity) Illiquidity measured by an average yearly mean of daily illiquidity where 
daily illiquidity is the absolute return divide by volume in local currency, and Age the firm’s age . “a”, 
“b”, and “c” denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
     Model 1    Model 2    
   DIVIDEND   DIVIDEND   
GOV_Dum     0.018 c       
     (0.009)        
GOV_Stake         0.137  c   
         (0.071)    
Profitability (%)(T-1 )     0.058 c   0.0605 c   
     (0 .032)    (0.033)    
Log(Illiquidity)(T-1 )     0.001    0.0016    
     (0 .002)    (0.002)    
Leverage. M (%)(T-1 )     -0.062 a    -0.0649 a    
     (0.020)    (0.020)    
27 
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Log(Size)     0.004 c   0.004 c   
     (0.002)    (0.002)    
Age ( T-1 )     -0.00008    0.00005    
     (0.0006)    (0.0006)    
return_variance(T-1 )     -0.012    -0.0139    
     (0.009)    (0.181)    
constant     0.058    0.043    
     (0.048)    (0.0475)    
Time Trends effects     Yes    Yes    
Year effects     Yes    Yes    
N     521    521    
Adj. R2     0.129    0.1319    
 
4.5 Robustness  
4.5.1 Controlling for the year effect 
The rise in aggregate idiosyncratic volatility suggested by the prior research may create a 
spurious association between state ownership and the firm’s idiosyncratic volatility. In the main 
results, in Table 4, we have used time trend to deal with this issue. However, in Table 8, we further 
control for the influence of aggregate trends by adding a dummy for each year in our model, and 
the estimated coefficients on government ownership remain negative and significant, but with a 
lower level of significance at 10% for  model 1 and model 5. Also, there is a lower level of 
significance at 5% for model 4.
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Table 8: The government ownership and the firm’s idiosyncratic volatility 
 This table shows the results of the estimates from the fixed effect model with adjusting the standard errors for clustering by firm. The sample 
consists of 669firm year observations on 127 unique Saudis non-financial firms that traded in the Saudi stock exchange for seven years from 
between 2010 and 2016. The predictor variable is the firm’s idiosyncratic risk estimated by the log of standard deviation of the sum of squared 
residuals from market model log(IV_CAPM) , Fama-French 3-factor model log(IV_FF3) , or total volatility log(IV_SD), which is estimated by the 
log of standard deviation of daily returns over each year. The independent variables are GOV_Dum a dummy variable that equals one if the firm 
has the government ownership and zero otherwise, GOV_Stake (%) the government ownership as a percentage, Leverage. M (%) Market 
leverage ratio measured by total debt over the firm market value, Log(Size) the size as the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets, 
Profitability (%) profitability as net income to the total assets ratio (ROA), return_variance variance of return as the variance of the net income 
over the total assets , Log(Illiquidity) Illiquidity measured by an average yearly mean of daily illiquidity where daily illiquidity is the absolute 
return divide by volume in local currency, and Age the firm’s age . “a”, “b”, and “c” denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
  log(IV_FF3) Log(IV_CAPM) log(IV_SD)  log(IV_FF3) Log (IV_CAPM) log(IV_SD)  
GOV_Dum  -0.110 c -0.106 c -0.100 a       
  (0.063)  (0.061)  (0.033)        
GOV_Stake        -1.256 b -0.940 c -0.418  
        (0.524)  (0.557)  (0.536)  
Profitability (%) (T-1 )  -0.754 a -0.970 a -0.837 a -0.773 a -0.984 a -0.843 a 
  (0.192)  (0.265)  (0.191)  (0.188)  (0.263)  (0.189)  
Log(Illiquidity) (T-1 )  0.154 a 0.141 a 0.088 a 0.156 a 0.142 a 0.088 a 
  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.019)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.019)  
Leverage. M (%) (T-1 )  0.467 a 0.654 a 0.477 a 0.482 a 0.667 a 0.487 a 
  (0.176)  (0.233)  (0.150)  (0.176)  (0.232)  (0.150)  
Log(Size)  0.158 a 0.128 a 0.091 a 0.159 a 0.128 a 0.090 a 
  (0.027)  (0.035)  (0.024)  (0.027)  (0.035)  (0.024)  
Age ( T-1 )  0.042 a 0.047 a 0.044 a 0.040 a 0.046 a 0.043 a 
  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.007)  
return_variance (T-1 )  0.017  0.097  0.120  0.019  0.102  0.129  
  (0.132)  (0.182)  (0.147)  (0.132)  (0.181)  (0.146)  
Constant  -2.933 a -3.157 a -1.011 a -2.787 a -3.055 a -0.981 a 
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  (0.488)  (0.513)  (0.353)  (0.482)  (0.511)  (0.363)  
Time Trends effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N  526  526  526  526  526  526  
Adj. R2  0.264  0.167  0.401  0.267  0.168  0.401  
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4.5.2 Heckman (1979) two-stage approach 
In our analyses, we used the firm-year fixed-effect model to control for endogeneity. 
Furthermore, we will address endogeneity concerns by applying the Heckman (1979) two-stage 
approach. Therefore, we will test the possibility that there is an unobserved variable in the error 
term is affecting the government ownership which results in biased and inconsistent estimates. 
Table 9: The government ownership and endogeneity 
 This table shows results after controlling for endogeneity by applying Heckman (1979) two-stage 
approach. The first stage we use a probit regression model and control for the year and industry effect. 
The second stage, we use the fixed effect model by adjusting the standard errors for clustering by firm 
and Year. The sample consists of 669firm year observations on 127 unique Saudis non-financial firms 
that traded in the Saudi stock exchange for seven years from between 2010 and 2016. The predictor 
variable is the firm's idiosyncratic risk estimated by the log of the standard deviation of the sum of 
squared residuals from the Fama-French 3-factor model log(IV_FF3). The independent variables are 
GOV_Dum a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has the government ownership and zero 
otherwise, LAMBDA the residual from the first stage, Leverage. M (%) Market leverage ratio measured 
by total debt over the firm market value, Log(Size) the size as the natural logarithm of the firm's total 
assets, Profitability (%) profitability as net income to the total assets ratio (ROA), return_variance 
variance of return as the variance of the net income over the total assets , Log(Illiquidity) Illiquidity 
measured by an average yearly mean of daily illiquidity where daily illiquidity is the absolute return 
divide by volume in local currency, and Age the firm’s age . “a”, “b”, and “c” denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Heckman (1979) 
  Model 1 
  
Model 2    
First Stage 
  
Second Stage 
 
        log(IV_FF3)   
GOV_Dum 
   
-0.118 c     
(0.062) 
 
LAMBDA 
   
-0.057 
 
    
(0.053) 
 
Profitability (%)(T-1 ) 4.367 
  
-0.957 a  
(4.713) 
  
(0.318) 
 
Log(Illiquidity)(T-1 ) -0.303 c 
 
0.164 a  
(0.340) 
  
(0.025) 
 
Leverage. M (%)(T-1 ) 3.107 
  
0.306 
 
 
(1.866) 
  
(0.254) 
 
Log(Size) 1.458 a 
 
0.097 
 
 
(0.389) 
  
(0.067) 
 
Age ( T-1 ) 0.026 
  
0.046 a  
(0.026) 
  
(0.008) 
 
return_variance(T-1 ) -5.924 b 
 
0.273 
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(2.867) 
  
(0.283) 
 
constant -15.414 b 
 
-2.340 a  
(7.772) 
  
(0.775) 
 
N 
   
526 
 
Adj. R2 
   
0.2814 
 
Year effect Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Industry effect Yes 
   
 
In Table 9, the two models show the results of the Heckman (1979) two-stage approach. In 
the first stage (model 1), we regress the binary variable of government ownership (GOV_Dum) on 
all control variables. Here we used the probit regression model and control for the year effect and 
industry effect, and then we use the residual value in the second stage as an explanatory variable 
(LAMBDA) with government ownership and other control variables against the dependent 
variable, idiosyncratic volatility. The results reported in Table 9 model 2 show that the coefficient 
on government ownership remains negative and significant at the 5% level and, at the same time, 
LAMBDA is not significant, which indicates that our results are not influenced by selection bias. 
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5 Conclusion 
We examine the effect of state ownership on idiosyncratic volatility of Saudi Arabian firms 
that traded in the Saudi stock exchange between 2010 and 2016. We estimate firm-specific risk as 
the standard deviation of the residuals from regressing of market model and three-factor model. 
The results show that firms with greater government ownership tend to have less idiosyncratic 
volatility. This result is robust even after controlling for the firm and year effect. 
Furthermore, we investigate market leverage ratio, dividend payout ratio, and illiquidity ratio 
as potential roles through which government ownership influences idiosyncratic volatility. The 
results of these roles verify the negative association between government ownership and 
idiosyncratic volatility. Moreover, the government as a safeguard and as a banker can be effective 
in increasing firm recognition and liquidity. As a result, the higher liquidity will decrease the level 
of asymmetric information which reduces the transaction cost and lowers leverage by increasing 
preference of equity financing when raising capital which eventually reduces the idiosyncratic 
volatility. 
Finally, the dividend payout as the second role suggests that government ownership will 
reduce financial pressure thus allowing firms with government ownership to pay higher dividends, 
and that may send a strong signal about the bright prospects of the firm in the market which 
ultimately reduces the idiosyncratic volatility. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Momentum Trading and Government Ownership 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
While there is a continuing debate over momentum drivers, it seems that both behavioral and 
risk-based momentum theories tend to agree on the view that information uncertainty magnifies 
the momentum effect. Hirshleife (2001) suggests that investors’ behavioral biases (e.g., 
overconfidence and conservatism) are more significant when dealing with high-uncertainty stocks, 
resulting in greater momentum. By the same token, momentum traders gain greater returns as a 
reward for getting the additional risk linked with highly uncertain stocks. Consistent with this, 
Daniel and Titman (1999) state that the “momentum effect is likely to be the strongest in those 
stocks whose valuation requires the interpretation of ambiguous information.” Furthermore, 
Zhang’s (2006) empirical evidence implies that uncertainty limits the reflection of information 
onto the stock return. Hence, he argues that momentum strategies work better when restricted to 
trading in stocks with high uncertainty.  
Evidence also indicates that firms with government ownership are less transparent relative to 
private firms (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). Supporting this view, several studies confirm a 
negative correlation between the quality of financial reporting and state ownership (Bushman et 
al., 2004; Chaney et al., 2011). Also, prior research suggests that firms with government ownership 
avoid greater levels of transparency that could uncover political transactions or investments that 
are inconsistent with value maximization (Megginson and Netter,2001). 
However, prior literature also supports advantages of state ownership. Beuselinck et al. (2017) 
propose that state ownership usually correlates with a higher valuation. Also, Boubakri et al. 
(2018) find a nonlinear relation between market value and government ownership. 
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Moreover, and consistent with the soft budget constraints, Chaney et al. (2011) suggest that 
investors will accept a higher cost of debt if firms with lower financial reporting have a connection 
with political parties or governments. Therefore, this political connection might result in soft 
budget constraint (Kornai, 1979). Moreover, Boubakri et al. (2012) suggest that the protective role 
of government may rescue firms in distressed times, and investors value this protective role. Also, 
Faccio et al. (2006) suggest that the government as a major shareholder probably will bail out their 
firms with their significant financial resources, and this role can be observed and valued by 
investors.  There are other benefits related to government ownership as well, such as protecting 
the political firms from competitors. 
Furthermore, government ownership can also be related to better corporate governance and 
better monitoring (Attig et al., 2008; Borisova et al., 2012) which may limit the agency costs 
problem while improving a firm's transparency and reducing asymmetric information (Hope et al., 
2009). Also, firms with government ownership are subject to more considerable media attention 
that enhance the public information environment (Vega, 2006). 
In the same vein, Borisova et al. (2015) examine the asymmetric information among investors 
in firms with government ownership. They propose that firms with government ownership have 
lower overall information asymmetry which results in higher liquidity. 
To the best of our knowledge, none of the previous literature explicitly examines the 
relationship between state ownership and momentum. Therefore, this study adds to earlier research 
by examining this relationship. Besides, most previous studies explore the link between 
momentum effects and firm characteristics (i.e., earnings growth, revenue volatility, trading 
volume, and analyst coverage). However, these variables often change and may have dynamic 
effects on momentum. Rather than seeking momentum profits through trading stocks based solely 
on firm characteristics, momentum traders should also consider basing their investment decisions  
on whether or not the firm is associated with the government. Bortolotti and Faccio (2009) propose 
that government shareholders are reluctant to abandon control of companies they own even many 
years after privatization. As a result, this suggests that it is less likely for the effects of government 
ownership on momentum to change in the short term. 
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This paper proposes the following hypothesis: all things being equal, momentum effects are 
greater in firms with relatively high levels of government ownership. A testable hypothesis is that 
firms with greater levels of government ownership are expected to have relatively greater stock 
returns associated with good news (past winners) and relatively lower stock returns related to bad 
news (past losers) (Zhang, 2006).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section highlights some of the 
well-established momentum theories and addresses empirical studies that show how government 
ownership might relate to momentum. In the third section, we present the data and hypotheses 
developments. In the fourth section, we introduce the methodology and findings. Finally, in the 
last section, we present the conclusion. 
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2 Literature Review 
Asness et al. (2014) define momentum as “the phenomenon that stocks which have performed 
well relative to peers  on average (winners) continue to outperform, and stocks that have performed 
relatively poorly (losers) tend to continue to underperform.” This definition uses the term relative 
to distinguish between momentum and trend following. To illustrate the difference, trend 
following exposure increases during upswings, whereas momentum is not explicitly affected by 
market trends. Understanding this view is essential since this paper aims to examine the degree to 
which firm stocks with greater levels of government ownership on average continue to outperform 
(or underperform) firm stocks with lower government ownership.  
Furthermore, it is important to note the fact that momentum does exist and is evident in more 
than two hundred years of U.S. equity data. In their article, Asness et al. (2014) argue that the 
theoretical debate should not be confused with the consensus on the effectiveness and existence of 
momentum. In this section, we highlight some of the well-established behavioral and risk-based 
momentum theories. 
2.1  Theoretical Explanation 
Most momentum theories fall into one of two categories. The first category is the behavioral-
based or irrational theories, while the second is the risk-based or rational theories. Behavioral 
approaches explain momentum using concepts from psychology (e.g., overconfidence and 
conservatism). On the other hand, risk-based arguments justify momentum premiums as 
compensation for risk (systematic risk).  
Daniel et al. (1998) evolve a behavioral theory based on investor overconfidence and self-
attribution. Using psychological surveys and experiments, they show that investors work to 
exaggerate their abilities and underestimate their prediction errors. If traders have more confidence 
about signals with which they have more special engagement, they will, in return, underreact to 
public signals. After traders absorb an endorsing public signal, their confidence will increase. 
Disconfirming signals, on the other hand, will cause confidence to decrease only modestly. Hence, 
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a confirming public signal triggers an overreaction. Daniel et al. (1998) imply that such 
overreaction results in price momentum. According to the Daniel et al. (1998) model, momentum 
should be higher with stocks that are hard to estimate (i.e., growth stocks or glamour stocks) or 
where feedback is ambiguous or slow (i.e., small-firms’ stocks).  
Barberis et al. (1998) also use concepts from psychology to construct a theory of investor 
sentiment based on conservatism. Earnings in the Barberis et al. (1998) model attend a random 
walk, but traders consider that earnings move between two states a steady growth state or a 
mean-reverting state. In the investor's mind, it is more likely for earnings to stay in one state 
instead of switching to another state. In every period, the trader uses information he perceives to 
update his view about which regime he is in. While refreshing, traders are conservative in that 
they gradually and inadequately refresh their opinions in the light of new information. This 
biased behavior results in initial price underreaction. But when investors observe a long sequence 
of confirming news, their prior beliefs become stronger, making them slower and more reluctant 
in their update of disconfirming news. Consequently, stocks tend to become undervalued or 
overvalued. Ultimately, prices will revert to intrinsic values in the long-term as realized earnings 
fail to meet the investor’s expectations.  
Unlike the theories that are based on investor psychology (Barberis et al.,1998; Daniel et 
al.,2001), Hong and Stein (1999) suggest two types of traders: momentum traders and news-
watchers. The momentum traders rely solely on information about previous returns changes. The 
premise that information expands slowly induces initial underreaction to the news whereas the 
news-watchers rely solely on news that they privately perceive about expected fundamentals. This 
underreaction and the following positive stock returns draw the attention of momentum traders. 
The initial underreaction will then turn into an overreaction as more and more momentum traders 
observe this positive autocorrelation. In the long run, prices will revert to their intrinsic values. 
Also, prior research attributes price momentum to the slow reaction of the market to information 
diffusion (Chan et al., 1996).  
In the risk-based theory, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) were the first to develop the risk-based 
theory, which justifies the momentum premium. After examining relative strength strategies for 
stocks over three to twelve-month horizons, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find evidence that the 
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momentum profit strategies are not a result of the firm’s systematic risk; instead, they are related 
to the delayed stock price responses to idiosyncratic information. Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) 
theory implies that momentum traders earn return premiums as a reward for taking the risk arising 
from the uncertain delay. 
 Finally, Zhang (2004) suggests another risk-based theory in which rational firms do not react 
dynamically to unpredictable macro risks but rather adjust their business and react to predictable 
micro risks. Consequently, the firm's risk exposure will vary over time. The author gives an 
example of a car manufacturing firm that anticipates a higher demand for sports utility vehicles 
(SUVs). As the firm expands its SUV production line, it will realize more earnings. Meanwhile, 
higher oil risks will increase the firm's risk exposure because SUVs are more exposed to variations 
in oil prices. As a result, this causes investors to make investment decisions based on their 
judgment about the macro risk, so uncertainty is then doubled resulting in a nonlinear risk. 
Momentum profits are viewed as an incentive to compensate investors for dealing with the 
nonlinear twofold risk. Consequently, since firms with government ownership have goals that do 
not correspond with profit maximization, they may not react to their predictable risk as rational 
firms do. Therefore, this makes it harder for investors to infer a firm’s micro risks based on the 
firm's investment dynamics, resulting in higher nonlinear risk and greater momentum rewards. 
2.2 Momentum  
Daniel and Titman’s (1999) empirical evidence suggests that growth stocks exhibit greater 
momentum effects than value stocks. So, this implies that stocks that require the interpretation of 
ambiguous information have the strongest momentum effects. Similarly, Sagi and Seasholes 
(2007) propose that the profit of momentum strategies is more significant in firms with valuable 
growth options, low costs, and high revenue volatility. They argue that companies that have 
performed well (winners) tend to utilize their valuable growth options more, but they are risky and 
hence are associated with greater expected returns (higher momentum profits). Furthermore, a 
positive revenue shock to firms with low fixed costs will be reflected in the firms’ profit margins 
with a delay. A common element in the above two studies is that they both suggest a greater 
momentum effect in stocks that are hard to value due to uncertainty regarding firm growth and 
future revenue. 
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 Hong et al. (2000) test the argument that momentum is because of the slow diffusion of the 
firm’s specific information. They use firm size and analyst coverage to sort securities into different 
classes, then test whether securities of larger firms or greater analyst coverage exhibit greater 
momentum. Hong et al.’s (2000) empirical evidence suggests that momentum profits decline as 
firm size increases. Further, holding firm size fixed, momentum effects are higher in securities 
with lower analyst coverage. The evidence that momentum effects are greater in stocks with low 
trading volume and small firm sizes is in line with Hong et al. (2000) theory. The evidence also 
suggests that information uncertainty plays a vital role in modeling the level of momentum effects. 
Lastly, Zhang (2006) tests how information uncertainty impacts momentum. He argues that if 
price continuation anomalies are due to traders’ behavioral biases (i.e., underreaction or 
overreaction to public information). Moreover, Zhang uses two proxies for news (i.e., past stock 
returns and analyst prediction) and six measurements for information uncertainty (i.e., firm’s size, 
firm’s age, cash flow volatility, stock volatility, dispersion in analyst forecasts, and analyst 
coverage). Zhang’s empirical evidence proposes that information uncertainty limits the reflection 
of information incorporated into prices. Hence, momentum strategies work better when restricted 
to trading in stocks with high risk. 
Chan et al. (1996) test whether investor's underreaction causes predictability of future returns 
to prior news.  They explain that because accounting numbers do not perfectly measure economic 
earnings, current earnings tend to be low even if the firm's prospects are improving. Consistent 
with this, Chan et al.’s (1996) empirical evidence attributes the momentum influence on the 
postponed response of stock prices to prior earnings information. In a similar manner, Chordia and 
Swaminathan (1999) indicate that, at short horizons, stocks with low liquidity show greater 
underreaction than stocks with high liquidity.  
However, literature suggests a positive relationship between momentum and liquidity. 
Avramov et al. (2015) find market illiquidity measured by Amihud (2002) reduces the momentum. 
They observe that high market liquidity supports the price continuations, consequently generating 
a positive momentum profit. Besides, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) claim that previous stock 
liquidity can predict the persistence of price momentum. Lee and Swaminathan’s (2000) empirical 
evidence suggests that, among winners, stocks with high liquidity exhibit greater momentum 
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persistence. Also, Glaser and Weber (2001) find that momentum is robust among high liquidity 
stocks.  
Due to the positive relationship between momentum and liquidity as our results confirm, we 
argue that higher levels of government ownership are more likely to lead to higher momentum 
effects since our results support the positive correlation between the government ownership and 
liquidity as reported in Table 13. Also, this evidence supports the beneficial role of government 
ownership as we will discuss in more detail in the following subsection. 
2.3  Government Ownership  
Prior research provides conflicting evidence on the beneficial role of government ownership. 
One line of literature supports the negative role of government ownership for many reasons. The 
first reason is that the government has motives to be less transparent than Privately owned firms. 
Piotroski et al. (2015) imply that state owners avoid political costs by suppressing negative 
information. Likewise, Leuz and Gee (2006) propose that companies that are associated with a 
government suffer from an information asymmetry problem because the government might 
uncover illegal and politically transactions. Moreover, Megginson and Netter (2001) suggest that 
governments tend to expropriate stockholders by pursuing political goals that do not correspond 
with profit maximization (e.g., high employment and regional development)5. To conceal this 
expropriation, bureaucrats and managers in government-owned companies may manipulate 
earnings or financial reports, resulting in a less transparent environment. Because the cost of 
collecting private firm-specific information is higher in less informative environments, 
government-owned companies may discourage informed trading which leads to less informative 
prices (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). 
The second reason is that firms with government ownership suffer from lower accounting 
quality6. Chaney et al. (2011) suggest that firms with government ownership have lower 
accounting information. Similarly, Bushman et al. (2004) imply that government-owned firms tend 
to have a negative correlation with accounting transparency. Furthermore, Fan et al. (2007) report 
inferior accounting quality for privatized companies because governments often use political 
                                                          
5 Bushman and Piotroski (2006) propose that the state's utilization of firm resources is more severe with lower political rights environment. 
6 (Chen et al., 2007) observe a positive relation between stock price informativeness and investment sensitivity to stock price. 
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connections to maintain their control7. Likewise, Wang et al. (2008) state that firms with 
government ownership tend to hire smaller auditing firms than privatized firms.  
The third reason is that government ownership tends to increase information uncertainty. Kim 
and Verrecchia (1994) discuss how the lower information transparency surrounding government-
owned enterprises leads to lower levels of public information incorporated into stock prices, 
suggesting smaller advantages to professional traders and decreasing the information asymmetry 
endured by unskilled traders. Furthermore, Jin and Myers (2006) find a positive relation between 
stock prices’ informativeness and countries’ transparency. Moreover, Gul et al. (2010) study the 
impact of government ownership concentration, financial reporting quality, and foreign ownership 
on synchronicity. The results of a study conducted by Tee et. al (2017) suggest that stock prices 
are less informative when the major owner has a political connection. As a result, this work is in 
line with the idea that government ownership results in ambiguous financial disclosures and lowers 
minority shareholders' protection rights (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Also, Tee et. al (2017) find 
that auditor quality and foreign ownership are positively related to stock informativeness. 
However, the second line of literature also supports advantages of state ownership. Beuselinck 
et. al (2017) propose that state ownership usually correlates with a higher valuation. Also, 
Boubakri et.al  (2018) find a nonlinear relation between market value and government ownership. 
Moreover, and consistent with the soft budget constraints, Chaney et. al (2011) suggest that 
investors will accept a higher cost of debt if firms with lower financial reporting have a connection 
with political parties or the government. Therefore, this political connection might result in soft 
budget constraint (Kornai, 1986). Moreover, Boubakri et al. (2012) suggest that the protective role 
of the government may rescue firms in distressed times, and investors value this protective role. 
Also, Faccio et al. (2006) suggest that as a major shareholder, the government  will probably bail 
out its firms with its significant financial resources, and this role can be observed and valued by 
investors. Moreover, there are other benefits related to government ownership, such as protecting 
the political firms from competitors. 
                                                          
7 (Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009) propose that governments shareholders are reluctant to abandon control even years after privatization. 
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Furthermore, government ownership can be related to better corporate governance and better 
monitoring (Attig et al., 2008; Borisova et al., 2012) which may limit the agency costs problem 
while improving a firm's transparency and reducing asymmetric information (Hope et al., 2009). 
Also, firms with government ownership are subject to more considerable media attention which 
improves the public information environment (Vega, 2006). 
In the same vein, Borisova et al. (2015) examine the asymmetric information among investors 
in firms with government ownership. They propose that firms with government ownership have 
lower overall information asymmetry.  
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3 Data and Methodology 
The beneficial role of government ownership in Saudi Arabia gives us the advantage of 
studying such a role in low information environments because the Saudi Arabian government’s 
role as a safeguard and as a banker could be useful in increasing firm recognition and liquidity, 
and this role is valued and observed by investors. Also, ownership structure is expected to be 
more definite in emerging markets than in a rich information environment (Verrecchia, 2001), 
and the Saudi Arabian stock market is one of the emerging markets. 
The government continues to be one of the significant shareholders of the Saudi Arabian 
market. The primary government shareholders (i.e., Public Investment Fund, General 
Organization for Social Insurance, and Public Pension Agency) owned about 42% of the total 
market capitalization in 2018, which is 451 billion U.S. dollars and 32% of market capitalization 
of the Saudi banks in 2019.   
Therefore, we hand-collect government ownership data from the market index (TASI) from 
2010 to 2016. The primary independent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm 
has government ownership and zero otherwise. Also, we include government ownership as a 
percentage of the company owned by the government. The lowest government ownership in our 
data is 5%, and the highest rate is 83.8% as shown in Table10. Previous research assigns 
different threshold percentages to define government ownership as a percentage. For example, 
LaPorta et al. (1999) use 20 percent as a threshold to define controlling shareholder or the 
ultimate owner.  
Our sample consists of 669 firm-year observations on 127 unique Saudi Arabian non-
financial firms that traded in the Saudi stock exchange for seven years between 2010 and 2016. 
Moreover, the firm fundamentals are from Bloomberg terminal (yearly from 2010 to 2016). 
Also, we use daily and monthly prices from the market index (TASI), as well as market return 
from 2010 to 2016.  
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Additionally, we use the end-of-month Saudi Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR) from 
Bloomberg terminal. The SIBOR rate serves as a measurement for the monthly risk-free rate for 
seven years from 2010 to 2016 to calculate the idiosyncratic volatility. The firm’s idiosyncratic 
risk is estimated by the log of the standard deviation of the sum of squared residuals from the 
Fama-French 3-factor model log(IV_FF3) following Ang et al. (2006). 
Also, we compute the dependent variable the “momentum returns” as the cumulative monthly 
returns from past months t-12 to t-2 (Fama and French, 1996). Also, we define Momentum_Dum 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm’s price momentum is above the 75% percentile of the 
price momentum of the whole sample and zero if the firm’s price momentum is below 25% 
percentile of the price momentum returns. 
Based on the benefits role of government ownership research, we hypothesized that the 
government as safeguard could be useful in increasing the firm’s momentum through recognition 
and liquidity theories. Avramov et al. (2015) find market illiquidity (Amihud, 2002) reduces the 
momentum, so they conclude that there is a positive relation between the liquidity and momentum. 
Also, they observe that high market liquidity supports the price continuations, consequently 
generating a positive momentum profit. Therefore, we hypothesized that the government as 
safeguard could be effective in increasing the firm’s momentum through recognition and liquidity 
theories. 
H: Momentum effects are greater in firms with relatively higher levels of government 
ownership. 
Table 10 : The descriptive statistics 
This table shows descriptive statistics for variables used in our model of the influence of 
government ownership on momentum. The sample consists of 669 firm-year observations on 127 
unique Saudis non-financial firms that traded in the Saudi stock exchange for seven years from 
between 2010 and 2016. The regression variables in the fixed effect model are the dependent variable is 
Momentum is the firm specific momentum measured as the cumulative monthly returns from past 
months t-12 to t-2 (Fama and French, 1996).  GOV_Dum a binary variable that equals1 if the firm has 
the government ownership and zero otherwise, GOV_Stake (%) the government ownership as 
percentage, Log(Size) the size as the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets, Vol(ROA) variance of 
return as the variance of the net income over the total assets , Log(Illiquidity) Illiquidity measured by 
an average yearly mean of daily illiquidity where daily illiquidity is the absolute return divide by  
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(table continued) 
 
volume in local currency, and Age the firm’s age . Bold font implies statistical significance at the 1% 
level. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Momentum (%) 669 0.038 0.275 -0.57 1.326 
log(IV_FF3) 669 -4.140 0.362 -5.025 -1.784 
GOV_Stake(%) 669 0.080 0.172 0.000 0.838 
GOV_Dum 669 0.330 0.471 0.000 1.000 
log(Illiquidity ) 669 -21.06 0.987 -25.0 -18.55 
log(Size) 669 6.132 1.090 1.790 11.278 
Age 669 26.393 14.217 2.000 63.000 
Variance of return 643 0.120 0.108 0.015 0.346 
 
Table 10 shows descriptive statistics for variables used in our model of the influence of 
government ownership on momentum effects. The sample consists of 669 firm-year observations. 
We find that the average government ownership is 33%, the highest percentage is 83.8%. The 
profitability for the full sample is about 6.6%. Also, the highest firm-specific momentum return is 
1.326 while the lowest is -0.57. 
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Table 11 : Pearson pairwise correlation 
This table shows Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients between the variables used in our regression. 
The sample consists of 669firm year observations on 127 unique Saudis non-financial firms that traded 
in the Saudi stock exchange for seven years from between 2010 and 2016. The regression variables are 
the dependent variable is Momentum is the firm specific momentum measured as the cumulative 
monthly returns from past months t-12 to t-2 (Fama and French, 1996).  GOV_Dum a binary variable 
that equals1 if the firm has the government ownership and zero otherwise, GOV_Stake (%) the 
government ownership as percentage, Log(Size) the size as the natural logarithm of the firm's total 
assets, Vol(ROA) variance of return as the variance of the net income over the total assets , 
Log(Illiquidity) Illiquidity measured by an average yearly mean of daily illiquidity where daily 
illiquidity is the absolute return divide by volume in local currency, and Age the firm’s age . Bold font 
implies statistical significance at the 1% level. 
  Momentum GOV_Stake GOV_ Dum Log (Illiquidity ) Log (Size) Age Vol(ROA) 
Momentum  1.000                 
GOV_Stake 0.028 1.000               
GOV_Dum 0.023 0.658 1.000             
log(Illiquidity ) -0.27 -0.214 -0.125  1.000         
          
(table continued) 
 
log(Size) 0.195 0.326 0.270  -0.004  1.000     
Age -.04 0.070 0.036  0.257  0.331 1.0   
Vol(ROA) 0.109 -0.114 -0.074  -0.069  0.005 -.15 1.000 
 
Table 11 shows Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients between the model's variables. The 
results in Table 11 confirm the positive relationship between the two measurements of government 
ownership and momentum with 0.028 and 0.023. Also, the two measures of government ownership 
have a positive correlation with size, age, liquidity, and profitability. Contrarily, government 
ownership has a negative relationship with stock return volatility. 
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4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Portfolio effects of government ownership on price momentum:  
Following Zhang (2006), we use the two-way sorting approach to create four portfolios for 
each month. Specifically, we first sort price momentum into two groups (above 75% percentile 
“Winner portfolio” and below 25% percentile “Loser portfolio”). The returns of these two 
portfolios are based on the cumulative monthly returns from past months t-11 to t-1 (Zhang, 2006). 
Similarly, for each price momentum a group, we additionally classify stocks into two categories 
based on government ownership (%) (High and Low GOV_ownership). Lastly, we compute the 
equal weighted average for each portfolio. 
Table 12: The portfolio sorting approach 
 This table reports the equal weighted monthly returns of different portfolios sorted by price momentum and the 
government ownership (%) stake. For each month first, we classify price momentum into two groups (above 75% 
percentiles “Winner portfolio” and below 25% percentiles “Loser portfolio”). The returns of these two portfolios 
are based on the cumulative monthly returns from past months t-11 to t-1 (Zhang, 2006). Similarly, for each price 
momentum a group, we additionally classify stocks into two categories based on government ownership (%) 
(High and Low GOV_ownership). Lastly, we calculate the equal weighted for portfolio returns. The sample 
period is from January 2010 to December 2016. Inside parentheses, we  adjusted t- statistics for autocorrelation. 
   Momentum  
  M(Losers) M(Winners) W-L  
 
GOV(Low) 0.065 0.072 
0.007 
(1.196) 
 
GOV(High) 0.053 0.084 
0.030 
(4.750) 
 
 H-L 
-0.011 
(-1.924) 
0.011 
(1.6455) 
  
      
 
Table 12 shows the momentum effect (i.e., past winners continue to outperform from 7.2% to 
8.4%) is greater as the level of government ownership increases. We use T-test statistic to assess 
the differences in means between High GOV portfolio and Low GOV portfolio among winner 
stocks. The result suggests 1.1% positive return for High GOV portfolio relative to Low GOV 
portfolio, and it is significant at T-test (1.646).  
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 Also, the momentum effect (i.e., past losers continue to underperform from 6.5% to 5.4%) is 
greater as government ownership increased. The T-test suggests that the differences in means 
between High GOV portfolio and Low GOV portfolio among losers’ stocks are -1.1% negative 
return for High GOV portfolio relative to Low GOV portfolio, and it is significant at T-test (- 
1.646). Additionally, the negative return (-1.1%) and the positive return (1.1%) in Table 12 
indicate that government ownership correlated positively with momentum. Lastly, the return from 
the momentum trading strategies that take two positions, long in past winners, and short on past 
losers  within the High GOV portfolio, generates a positive (3%) relative to the same trading 
strategy within the Low GOV portfolio which indicates a greater momentum profit as government 
ownership increases.   
4.2  Fixed effect model: 
In this section, we follow Ben-Nasr and Cosset’s  (2014) methodology and control for firm 
and year binary variables to control for the selection bias problem (i.e., governments are inclined 
to privatize profitable firms and are reluctant to privatize firms in strategic industries). Also, we 
calculated the firm-specific momentum Momentum_Y from months t-12 to t-2 (Fama and French, 
1996) for each firm, and then we regressed the momentum on the two measurements of 
government. The result supports the previous portfolio sorting analysis. It shows a positive relation 
between momentum and government ownership. For example, the binary variable 
Momentum_Dum in model 1 in Table 13 has a significant and positive coefficient at 0.337 which 
indicates that government ownership increases momentum effect by 33.7%. Also, firm-specific 
momentum Momentum_Y has a positive and significant coefficient with 14.7%, so when 
government ownership increases by 1%, the firm-specific momentum increases by 14.7% as 
presented in the last two models in Table 13. 
Table 13 : The government ownership  and the firm’s momentum 
 This table shows results of the estimates from the fixed effect model with adjusting the standard errors 
for clustering by firm . The sample consist of 669firm year observations on 127 unique Saudis non-
financial firms that traded in the Saudi stock exchange during 7 years from between 2010 and 2016. The 
dependent variables are : Momentum_Dum a binary variable that equal 1 if the firm’s price momentum 
is above 75% percentile of the price momentum of the whole sample and zero if the firm’s price 
momentum is below 25% percentile of the price momentum returns. Momentum_Y is the firm specific 
momentum measured as the cumulative monthly returns from past months t-12 to t-2 (Fama and  
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French, 1996 ). The independent variables are: GOV_Dum a binary variable that equal 1 if the firm has 
the government ownership and zero otherwise, GOV_Stake (%) the government ownership as 
percentage, log(IV_FF3) is firm’s idiosyncratic risk estimated by the log of standard deviation of the 
sum of squared residuals from Fama-French 3-factor model, Log(Size) the size as the natural logarithm 
of the firm's total assets, log(LIQ) firm’s liquidity measured by firm’s turnover as average yearly of 
daily turnover (the ratio of trading volume over shares outstanding), and Age the firm’s age . “a”, “b”, 
and “c” denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Momentum_Dum Momentum_Y Momentum_Y 
GOV_Dum  0.377 b     0.147 c 
  (0.188)       (0.084)   
GOV_Stake      0.976 a     
      (0.470)       
log(IV_FF3) 0.004   0.166 a 0.170 a 
  (0.049)   (0.048)   (0.043)   
log(LIQ) 0.166 a 0.114 a 0.114 a 
  (0.055)   (0.016)   (0.016)   
Log(Size)  0.343 a 0.235 a 0.238 a 
  (0.083)   (0.037)   (0.036)   
Age  -0.139 a -0.047 a -0.049 a 
  (0.017)   (0.008)   (0.007)   
return_variance  -0.342   -0.300 c -0.293 c 
  (0.388)   (0.132)   (0.133)   
constant 2.939 a 1.146 a 1.217 a 
  (0.918)   (0.293)   (0.290)   
Time Trends effects Yes   Yes   Yes   
N 321   529   529   
Adj. R2 0.457   0.282   0.284   
 
In the fixed effect model, we control for different variables following Chui et al. (2005). More 
precisely, we control for various firm characteristics proposed by behavioral studies: liquidity,  
size, age, a variance of return, and stock return volatility. 
First, we control for firm’s liquidity measured by firm’s turnover as the yearly average of 
daily turnover (the ratio of trading volume over shares outstanding). We include illiquidity to 
control information asymmetry (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Spiegel and Wang,2005). 
Therefore, consistent with Avramov et al. (2015), we find a positive and significant relationship 
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at 1%  between momentum and liquidity in all of the models in Table 13 with coefficients from 
0.166 to 0.114.  
Second,  Zhang (2006)’s empirical evidence suggests that momentum profits increase as firm 
size declines. Also, Zhang (2006) uses the firm’s size and the firm’s age as proxies for information 
uncertainty. Therefore, we control for the size as the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets. 
Contrarily to literature, we find a positive relationship between size and momentum. 
Moreover, Zhang (2006) uses the firm’s age to control for information uncertainty. More 
specifically, when the firm’s age increases, there will be more cumulation of the firm’s information 
which reduces the information uncertainty and eventually increases the eventually. Consistent with 
Zhang (2006), we find a negative and significant relationship on firm’s age coefficient with -0.139 
in the first model in Table 13 and about -0.048 for the last two models in the same table. 
4.3  Robustness 
In our analyses, we used the firm-year fixed-effect model to control for endogeneity. 
Furthermore, we will address endogeneity concerns by applying the Heckman (1979) two-stage 
approach to address the selection bias problem (i.e., governments tend to privatize profitable firms 
and are reluctant in privatizing firms in strategic industries). Also, we test the possibility that there 
is an unobserved variable in the error term affecting government ownership, thus resulting in 
biased and inconsistent estimates. 
Table 14: The government ownership  and endogeneity 
This table shows results after controlling for endogeneity by applying Heckman (1979) two-stage 
approach. First stage we use probit regression model and control for the year and industry effect. 
Second stage, we use the fixed effect model with adjusting the standard errors for clustering by firm 
and Year . The sample consist of 669firm year observations on 127 unique Saudis non-financial firms 
that traded in the Saudi stock exchange during 7 years from between 2010 and 2016. The dependent 
variables : Momentum_Y is the firm specific momentum measured as the cumulative monthly returns 
from past months t-12 to t-2 (Fama and French, 1996). The independent variables are: GOV_Dum a 
binary variable that equal 1 if the firm has the government ownership and zero otherwise, LAMBDA 
the residual from first stage, log(IV_FF3) is firm’s idiosyncratic risk estimated by the log of standard 
deviation of the sum of squared residuals from Fama-French 3-factor model, Log(Size) the size as the 
natural logarithm of the firm's total assets, log(LIQ firm’s liquidity measured by firm’s turnover as 
average yearly of daily turnover (the ratio of trading volume over shares outstanding), and Age the 
firm’s age . “a”, “b”, and “c” denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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(table continued)  
 Heckman (1979) 
  Model 1 
  
Model 2    
First Stage 
  
Second Stage 
 
(table continued) 
 
     
        Momentum_Y   
GOV_Dum 
   
0.106 b     
(0.044) 
 
LAMBDA 
   
0.059 a     
(0.019) 
 
log(IV_FF3) -1.802 a  0.317 a 
 (0.540)   (0.068)  
Log(Turnover) -0.774 c 
 
-0.002 
 
 
(0.470) 
  
(0.019) 
 
Log(Size) 0.778 c 
 
0.191 a  
(0.440) 
  
(0.037) 
 
Age  -0.014 
  
-0.049 a  
(0.054) 
  
(0.007) 
 
return_variance -2.525 
  
-0.045 
 
 
(2.226) 
  
(0.154) 
 
constant -17.446 a 
 
1.246 a  
(4.804) 
  
(0.390) 
 
N 529 
  
428 
 
Adj. R2 
   
0.616 
 
Year effect Yes 
  
Yes 
 
 
In Table 14, the two models show the results of the Heckman (1979) two-stage approach. In 
the first stage, model 1, we regress the binary variable of government ownership GOV_Dum on all 
control variables. Here we apply the probit regression model and control for the year effect, and 
then we include the residual value in the second stage as an explanatory variable (LAMBDA) with 
government ownership and other control variables against the predictor variable Momentum_Y, 
the firm specific momentum. The results reported in Table 14 model 2 show that the coefficient 
on government ownership is still negative and significant at the 5% level with 0.106. More 
importantly, the LAMBDA is significant, indicating that our results are controlled for endogeneity. 
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5 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the relationship between state ownership and momentum trading of 
firms traded in the Saudi Arabian stock exchange for seven years between 2010 and 2016. We 
used two approaches: the portfolio sorting approach and the fixed effect approach. The results of 
the two approaches show that firms with higher state ownership are expected to have greater price 
momentum. The result is robust even after controlling for the firm and year effect. Also, we use 
the Heckman (1979) endogeneity two-stage approach for controlling endogeneity, and the 
coefficient on government ownership remains negative and significant. 
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